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Abstract
We model and predict that politicians have incentives to delay bank failure in
election years and that this incentive is exacerbated if the election is close. Our
empirical application using the US data supports these predictions. At the bank level,
we show that bank failure in an election year is four times less likely to occur if the
election was among the most competitive (top quartile). At the state level, bank
failure is about 1.8 times less likely to occur in an election year. A three point swing
in the competitiveness of the election increases this election year bias to 2.2.
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In Washington, the view is that the banks are to be regulated, and my view is
that Washington and the regulators are there to serve the banks.
Rep. Spencer Bachus - chairman of the House Financial Services Committee in the 112th Congress1
1 Introduction
The relationship between banking and politics is an intimate one. Governments control
the supply of banks in the economy through chartering restrictions and licensing, they set
up institutions that provide depositors with insurance and banks with a lender of last resort,
and routinely set rules that attempt to govern the risk takingbehavior of banks. This
active role of government in the banking sector creates an incentive problem: on the one
hand, governments play a role in the creation of institutions that make a banking system
possible, while on the other hand they quite often look to the banking system as a source of
nance to facilitate its own political survival. This nancing can be indirect, through say,
subsidized lending to preferred industries or direct in the form of campaign contributions or
a share of prots due to ownership. For example, according to the Center for Responsive
Politics, Spencer Bachus, who is the chairman of the House Financial Services Committee
in the 112th Congress, raised over $2.3 million in campaign funds in 2011-2012 with the top
ve industries being commercial banks, securities and investment, insurance, real estate and
nance/credit companies contributing over 40 percent. On the government ownership of
banks, see La Porta et al. (2002) for evidence of pervasive state ownership of banks around
the world.
So, while a healthy banking system can be huge source of benet for politicians, bank
failure can get politicians into electoral hot water. Bank failure typically leads to costs that
are bourne by the taxpayer (due to losses to the insurance fund), leading the electorate to
1Quoted from an interview with The Birmingham News on 8 December 2010, one month after cruising
to victory in the general election facing no opponent. He had also previously won his 2010 primary with
76% of the vote.
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question the competency of the incumbent in regulating the banking sector. Accordingly,
politicians have the incentive to take costly action to delay bank failure - or more precisely,
delay regulatory intervention to close a failing bank. The economic cost of delay (possibly
from larger losses to the insurance fund than would otherwise be the case) is widespread
across tax payers, whereas the benets are concentrated with interest groups like bank own-
ers, employees and uninsured depositors - which further exacerbate the political incentive to
delay bank failure in an election year (see Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976, Becker 1983 for more
on interest groups).
There have been several examples in the popular press of political interference in the
banking system. Probably the most famous case is that of Lincoln Savings and Loans,
where ve US senators2 (known as the "Keating Five") were accused of improperly inter-
vening in a regulatory investigation of Charles H. Keating, Jr. (Chairman of the Lincoln
Savings and Loan Association) by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) in 1987.
Lincoln Savings and Loans eventually collapsed in 1989, at a cost of over $3 billion to the
federal government. The substantial political contributions Keating had made to each of the
senators, totaling $1.3 million, attracted considerable public and media attention leading to
a Senate Ethics Committee investigation in which three of the senators were found to have
"substantially and improperly interfered with the FHLBBs investigation" and the other two
while being cleared were still criticized for exercising "poor judgement". All ve senators
served out their terms however only the two ran for re-election.3 A more recent example
is that of Cleveland thrift AmTrust, whose failure was delayed by 11 months because Ohio
Congressman Steven LaTourette and Cleveland mayor Frank Jackson intervened when the
FDIC tried to seize and sell the institution in January 2009.4 By the time AmTrust was
2Alan Cranston (Democrat of California), Dennis DeConcini (Democrat of Arizona), John Glenn (Demo-
crat of Ohio), John McCain (Republican of Arizona), and Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (Democrat of Michigan)
3John Glenn (Democrat of Ohio) and John McCain (Republican of Arizona) were cleared of the charges
and re-ran for o¢ ce.
4AmTrust was issued with a cease and desist order in November 2008, and when they failed to recapitalise
by the deadline of December 31, 2008 the FDIC stepped in. The local politicians were able to delay the
failure by convincing Treasury and the White House to keep the FDIC at bay.
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nally seized by the FDIC on December 4, 2009 its common equity had fallen by $667 million
to $276 million from the year before. The failure cost the FDIC insurance fund $2 billion.5
It is reasonable to ask whether these incidents are isolated cases or whether they are
representative of a more systematic phenomenon. A natural place to look for systematic
evidence of political interference in banking is around elections as this is when bank failure
can potentially be the most costly to a politician. Accordingly, we develop a simple game-
theoretic model to study the incentive for incumbent politicians to delay bank failure. Our
model provides us with three predictions. First, we show that only in election years does
there exist a Nash-equilibrium where politicians will delay bank failure. Second, our model
also examines how the degree of political competition (i.e. how close the election is expected
to be) changes the politicians incentive to delay. In particular, our model predicts that
incumbent politicians are more likely to delay bank failure if the election is close. This comes
from the fact that bank failure is assumed to reduce the likelihood of winning the election,
which of course, becomes more important to prevent if the election is close. Finally, we
show that politicians are more likely to delay small banks rather than large banks. This
result occurs because, as the size of the failing bank grows, the private cost of delaying bank
failure is increasing at a faster rate than the private benets of delay.
Our empirical application tests these three predictions using data from the United States
(US) between 1934 and 2012, covering all failed banks (3995) documented by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We conduct the analysis both at the bank level
and at the state level by exploiting the signicant cross-state and within-state variation in
political competition to explain the timing of bank failure around the election cycle. A
consistent picture emerges: at the bank level, we nd that banks operating in a politically
competitive states are much less likely to fail in an election year. We also conrm our
prediction that small banks bank failure is more likely to be delayed in an election year. At
the state level, we show that the state election cycle is predictive of (a) the likelihood of bank
5See: http://blogs.reuters.com/rolfe-winkler/2009/12/08/politics-and-bank-regulation-dont-mix/
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failure; and (b) the state bank failure rate - that is, both the likelihood of bank failure and
the bank failure rate are lower in election years. Moreover, the impact of higher political
competition is to exacerbate this negative relationship. Our results are robust to the level
of analysis (bank vs. state), multiple model specications and estimation techniques.
Our results are not only statistically signicant but also economically meaningful. In
the bank level regressions, we estimate the relationship between political competition and
the timing of bank failure in a logistic regression, controlling for state level political factors
(the political a¢ liation of the governor and the degree of democrat control in the state
legislature), bank level factors (size, leverage, type of bank charter), failure characteristics
(whether the failure resulted in a payout, merger or was an assisted transaction). The
results show that bank failure is about 3.5 to 4 times less likely to occur in an election year if
the bank operated in a state where political competition was in the top quartile. Moreover,
small banks (those in the bottom size quartile) are 1.7 to 2 times less likely to fail in an
election year when compared to larger banks.
At the state level, we use several strategies to assess the relation between the election cycle
and the state bank failure rate. First, we use a logistic regression to determine whether
an election year reduces the likelihood of observing any bank failure while controlling for
state-level political and macroeconomic factors. The results indicate that bank failure is
approximately 1.8 times less likely an election year. When we consider the interaction
between election year and political competition this result is exacerbated. Consider a state
in which there is in increase in political competition of 0.03, this movement represents an
increase from our median value to the 75th percentile value for political competition and is
equivalent to a three point swing in the vote margin from 55-45 to 52-48. This leads to
an estimate for the magnitude of the overall impact of the election cycle on the likelihood
of bank failure increasing from 1.8 to approximately 2.2 - that is, bank failure is 2.2 times
less likely to occur in an election year if there has been a three point swing since the last
election.
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Second, we use the Tobit regression model to estimate the impact of election cycles and
political competition on the state bank failure rate. For the full sample, the bank failure
rate is 9 percent lower in election years than the unconditional mean. When the two major
banking crisis years are excluded from the sample (the Savings and Loans Crisis from 1986
to 1992 and the Global Financial Crisis from 2007 to 2010), the bank failure rate is 500
percent lower in election years than the unconditional mean (for non-crisis years). Our
coe¢ cient estimates for the interaction term between political competition and our election
year dummy suggest that the overall magnitude of the election year impact on bank failure
increases by 20 and 55 percent for the full and non-crisis samples respectively when the level
of political competition increases by 0.03.
Finally, to give an estimate of the likely economic cost of such delay in bank failure we
study whether the loss rate (estimated cost to the FDIC insurance fund relative to bank
assets at the time of failure) varies with the election cycle. We nd that banks failing in
election years have a loss rate that is approximately 5% less than those which fail in non-
election years. Based on the average size of failed banks, this translates to about an extra
$3 million in losses to the insurance fund (per failed bank) for banks failing in non-election
years (i.e. delayed failures).
Our work is related to several streams of literature. First, our work is most related to a
paper by Brown and Dinc (2005) who study electoral incentives to delay bank failure for a
sample of 164 banks (40 of which failed) in developing countries between 1994-2000. They
conduct their analysis at the bank level and show that bank failure is much less likely before
an election. Our work complements and extends theirs in several ways. First, a key focus of
our analysis is on political competition and its impact on bank failure during election years.
Unlike Brown and Dinc (2005) we build a simple model to develop clear testable implications
about the relation between elections, political competition and bank failure. Second, the
long term nature of our study allows us to study longer term trends in political competition
and its relation to bank failure. The long time series also provides us with a very large
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sample of failed banks in comparison to their study. Third, their analysis is conducted for
banks in developing countries where corruption is arguably more of a problem. In contrast,
we study the bank failure in the US - a thriving democracy and the most developed nation
in the world - and show that political incentives to delay bank failure near elections remains
strong. Finally, we conduct our analysis both at the bank level and at the state level and
show consistent results across both levels of analysis.
Second, our work relates directly to the early work arguing that politicians have incen-
tives to take actions to induce favorable macroeconomic outcomes before elections (see for
example, McRae (1977), Nordhaus (1975) and Rogo¤ and Sibert, 1988). More recent works
by Levitt (1997, 2002) use election cycles to instrument for the number of police in his study
of the relation between police and crime - arguing that politicians tend to hire more police
prior to elections. Election cycles have also been used recently in the analysis of corpo-
rate investment decisions; Julio and Yook (2012) document a fall in corporate investment
corresponding with timing of national elections around the world.
Third, this paper is related to a broad literature examining various aspects of the political
economy of banking and bank regulation. Earlier work examining the role of politics and
the incentives for regulators to intervene in failing banksoperations include Kroszner and
Strahan (1996), who show that regulators deferred the realization of costs in failing Savings
and Loan (S&L) associations in the United States. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) also
study the political economy factors that determine the timing of state level relaxation of
bank branching restrictions in the US and nd that private-interest (or positive) theory
of regulation (Stigler, 1971; and Peltzman, 1976) best explains the timing of branching
deregulation. Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) study how electoral rules (centrifugal vs.
centripetal) shape the way politicians choose to regulate their national banking sectors and
the resultant impact on market structure. Most recently, Dam and Koetter (2012) show
that political factors determine the likelihood of bank bailout and therefore bank risk taking
(moral hazard).
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The next section develops our simple game-theoretic model. Section three discusses how
the US election cycle works and provides some historical background on political competition
and bank failure in the US. Section four outlines our empirical approach and presents our
results. Section ve concludes.
2 A Simple Model
Consider a simple static game played by two players on day t: (1) a political candi-
date from the incumbent party seeking re-election, and (2) an owner-manager of an under-
capitalized bank that faces the risk of closure by the regulator.
First, let us look at the decision problem of the political candidate. Dene vi and vj
as the respective percentage share of the two-party vote received by candidate from the
incumbent party (denoted by i) and the opposition (denoted by j) on the election day T ,
for T > t. The electoral margin, ~ = vi   vj, is a random variable and it is drawn from a
uniform distribution: ~  U [ a; a], for a 2 [0; 1
2
]. If the competition between the two parties
is intense, the electoral margin is expected to be small, and hence the standard deviation of
~,  = ap3 is small.
Let us assume that there are M banks and N depositors in the economy, and all voters
have equal dollar amount of demand deposits (denoted by d) in these banks. Should the
bank fail, each depositor is insured up to some specied limit, and this limit is less than their
deposits. Prior to the election, one of the M banks is under-capitalized. The bank may or
may not be closed down by the regulator depending on whether the bank is willing to take
measures to recapitalize. If the bank fails to recapitalize, the regulator steps in and closes
the bank down. When this happens, due to under-insurance some depositors will lose part
of their deposits. We assume that n depositors (for n  N) are adversely a¤ected by the
bank closure and will accordingly vote against the incumbent party if it is an election year.
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The probability of winning the election falls from 1
2
to:
(1) Prf~ <   n
N
g.
If the political candidate i wins the re-election, he receives a monetary benet of W . Dene
F () as the cumulative probability function of . The expected gain for candidate i from
winning the election is:
(2) Prf~ <   n
N
gW = F    n
N

W .
Consider the strategy set of the political candidate i. If the bank does not recapitalize,
the regulator will want to close the bank, however, the political candidate may delay the bank
closure (by inuencing the regulator) until after the election so as to minimize the likelihood
of losing the election. However, inuencing the timing of bank failure is costly if he is found
to have used his political power inappropriately. Assume that the probability of being
caught is increasing in n (since the larger the population of individuals who are potentially
a¤ected by the bank failure the more visible is any political action to delay failure).6 The
probability he is caught is given by the following:
(3) Prf~ < n+1
N
g.
where ~  U [0; 1]. If the political candidate wins the election (with probability of Prf~ <
0g = F (0) = 1
2
) and gets caught, he loses his job (i.e. loses W ) and bears the penalty (in
monetary terms) P for loss of reputation and/or incurring cost related to civil litigation and
so on. Let G() be the cumulative probability function of , the expected monetary cost,
6Even if n = 0, we assume there is a small chance that the politician will be caught. That is, delaying
bank failure is never costless.
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C(n), can be described as:
(4) C(n) = F (0)G(n+1
N
)(W + P ).
The expected utility of the political candidate can be illustrated by the trade o¤ between
the expected gain associated with reducing the probability of losing the election and the
expected monetary cost if he delays the bank failure:
(5) ui(n) = F (0)W   F (0)G(n+1N )(W + P )  F
   n
N

W
The following lemma shows that the expected payo¤ for the political candidate is always
positive if n=N is su¢ ciently small.
Lemma 1. If W
P+W
> a, ui(n)  0 for nN 2
 
1
N
a
 
P+W
W

=
 
1  a  P+W
W

; W+P
W
+ 1
N

. If
W
P+W
< a, ui(n)  0 for nN 2 (0; WW+P + 1N ).
Proof. To prove this lemma, let us consider the following regions of n
N
: (i) (1   1
N
; 1), (ii)
(2a; 1  1
N
) and (iii) (0; 2a).
For n
N
2 (1  1
N
; 1),
ui(n) =

1
2
  0 

1
2

W  

1
2

P =  1
2
P .
For n
N
2 (2a; 1  1
N
),
ui(n) =

1
2
  0 

1
2

n+ 1
N

W  

1
2

n+ 1
N

P
=
1
2
W   1
2

n+ 1
N

(W + P )
and ui(n) > 0 if
n
N
<
W
W + P
+
1
N
,
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which holds true if W
W+P
< 1  2
N
.
For n
N
2 (0; 2a),
ui(n) =

1
2
   
n
N
+ a
2a
 

1
2

n+ 1
N

W  

1
2

n+ 1
N

P
=
1
N

n(1  a)  a
2a

W   1
N

n+ 1
2

P .
and ui(n) > 0 if:
n
N
>
1
N
 
a
 
P+W
W

1  a  P+W
W
!
Note that the above inequality always holds when W
P+W
< a since the right hand side of the
above inequality will be negative. Q.E.D.
Figure 1 illustrates the result of lemma 1. Consider the case where a is su¢ ciently large
(Panel a). Delaying the closure of a small bank (small n
N
) always yields a positive utility for
the political candidate. But as the penalty P rises, the expected payo¤ui(n) falls. Suppose
big banks and small banks have equal chance of failing. Then as the penalty rises (increases
P to P 0), the probability of observing a positive utility, Prfui(n) > 0j WP+W < ag falls from
W
W+P
+ 1
N
to W
W+P 0 +
1
N
. The expected payo¤ also falls. If a is su¢ ciently small (Panel b).
Delaying the closure of a small bank could be suboptimal.
An increase in P reduces the probability of observing a positive utility: Prfui(n) >
0j W
P+W
> ag = W
W+P
+ 1
N
  1
N

a(P+W )=W
1 a(P+W )=W

as:
(6)
@ Prfui(n) > 0j WP+W > ag
@P
=   W
(W + P )2
  a=W
N (1  a (P +W ) =W )2 < 0,
a falling a (for example, a decrease from a to a0 in Panel (b)) also increases the probability.
As can be seen from the gure, when a falls, it becomes more attractive for the politician to
delay the closure of smaller banks.
If there is no upcoming election, ui(0) < 0 if the politician delays failure, since it has no
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impact on the political outcome but the politician bears a positive cost: G( 1
N
)(W + p) > 0.
Now let us look at the owner-manager of the bank. At time t, the bank is under-
capitalized and there is a chance that the bank may fail to meet its demand deposits. The
owner-manager has two choices. He can either (i) take measures to reduce loss exposure
through managing the balance sheet (recapitalization), or (ii) take on more risk through
expanding the loan book to high risk lending in an attempt to generate higher returns (i.e.
gamble for resurrection). Dene k as the action taken by the banker, let k refer to action
(i) and k refer to action (ii). Dene D as the total demand deposits of the bank (D = nd)
and Lt as the expected value of loans at time t. For simplicity, we normalize the capital
requirement to zero, so a bank is said to be undercapitalized if D > Lt. If k = k, a rational
banker will supply no more capital than just enough to ensure that D = Lt, which implies
that ub(k) = 0.
If k = k, a rational banker takes more risk and saves the cost of supplying additional
capital. Since his equity is isomorphic to a call option (Black and Scholes (1973)), his
expected utility is always non-negative:
(7) ub = maxfLT  D; 0g,
which implies that: ub(k)  ub(k) = 0. However, there is a trade-o¤: if the bank chooses to
take on more risk, i.e. k = k, the regulator will close the bank down immediately since the
bank becomes critically undercapitalized (Lt falls further due to increased risk). If however,
the closure decision is delayed by politicians until after the election, this increases ub due to
the time value of the option. Upon the realization of loan values at date T , the bank may
or may not be closed down depending on whether the value of loans exceeds deposits. If on
date T , LT < D, the regulator will close the bank down otherwise the bank survives.
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2.1 Nash Equilibrium
The payo¤matrix of the game is presented in Table (1). Consider panel (a) where there
is a pending election. If the banker chooses to take on more risk, the political candidate
has the incentive to delay bank failure should loan value fall below the value of the demand
deposits, provided that the size of the bank is su¢ ciently small (due to lemma 1). If the
banker chooses to recapitalize the political candidate has the incentive to do nothing since
the decision to delay will give rise to non-zero probability of detection: Prf~ < 1
N
g = G( 1
N
)
> 0. Therefore, we have two Nash equilibria during the election year: (More Risky Loans,
Delay) and (Recapitalize, Do Nothing).
When there is no upcoming election, it is not optimal for the politician to delay the
closure of the bank since it has no impact on the political outcome. The optimal response
for the politician is to doing nothing. Hence it is not optimal for the banker to take on more
risk as the regulator would close the bank immediately. There is only one Nash equilibrium:
(Recapitalize, Do Nothing).
[Insert Table 1 Here]
This gives rise to the rst proposition:
Proposition 1 (Elections, Bank Size and Bank Failure). (a) Banks tend to fail less often
during an election year (i.e. failure is more likely to be delayed by politicians). (b) Small
banks are less likely to fail during an election year compared to large banks, ceteris paribus.
Proof. The rst part of the proposition follows immediately from the result of the Nash
game. The second part of the proposition follows from the result of lemma 1. If p > W , the
smaller the bank that is under-capitalized, the greater the likelihood that it will be delayed
until after the election as the condition for ui(n) > 0: nN <
W
W+p
+ 1
N
is more likely to bind.
Q.E.D.
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Next, we will show that if the electoral margin is small (i.e. election is competitive), the
political candidate is more likely to delay the bank closure.
Proposition 2 (Political Competition and Bank Failure). Ceteris paribus, political competi-
tion reduces the likelihood of bank failure during an election year (i.e. increases the likelihood
of delay).
Proof. If the competition between the two parties is intense, we expect the electoral margin
to be small and hence  to be small. Since  = ap3 , a low a implies a high level of political
competition. Based on the result of lemma 1, ui(n) is more likely to be positive with a
falling a since the condition n
N
> 1
N

a( p+WW )
1 a( p+WW )

is more likely to be satised:
@
@a
a
 
p+W
W

N
 
1  a  p+W
W
 =  p+WW 
N
 
1  a  p+W
W
2 > 0.
Hence, we are more likely to observe the Nash equilibrium (More Risky Loans, Delay) when
the competition between the two parties is more intense. Q.E.D.
3 Elections, Political Competition & Bank Failure
Election timing in the US is exogenously determined by law. Since 1845, election day
occurs on the Tuesday in November after the rst Monday - so election day must fall some-
where between November 2 and November 8 (inclusive). Presidential elections follow a four
year cycle on even numbered years. Other federal o¢ ces (House of Representatives and
Senate) run on a two year cycle on even numbered years.
At the state level, most states choose to run their elections in the same years at the federal
elections (only 5 states run their Gubernatorial elections in "o¤-years" or odd-numbered
years) and follow a two year cycle. For example, consider the Ohio General Assembly which
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is the state legislature of the US state of Ohio. It consists of the 99-member Ohio House
of Representatives and the 33-member Ohio Senate. Both houses of the General Assembly
meet at the Ohio Statehouse in Columbus. On Presidential election years (2012, 2016,
2020, etc.) - election day involves electing: President of the United States, U.S. Senator (if
term expires), Representatives to Congress, State Senators (even-numbered districts), State
Representative, State Board of Education (one-third of members), Supreme Court Justices
(two or three) and some county o¢ cials. For State election years (2014, 2018, 2022, etc.) -
election day involves electing: U.S. Senator (if term expires), Representatives to Congress,
Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of State, Auditor of State,
Attorney General, State Senators (odd-numbered districts), State Representatives, State
Board of Education (one-third of members), Supreme Court Justices (two or three) and
some county o¢ cials.
Our measure of political competition follows Besley et al. (2010) and uses data originating
from the work of Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002), who collected election results for a broad
set of directly elected state executive o¢ ces.7 Besley et al. (2010) dene a party neutral
measure of political competition to be the following:
(8) PCjt =  jdjt   0:5j
Where PCjt is political competition in state j at time t and djt is the vote share of the
Democrats in all state-wide races in state j at time t. Figure 2 extends the work of Besley
et al. (2010) and plots 10-year averages of political competition over time separately for
Southern and non-Southern states. As can be seen, there is signicant variation in political
competition across states and over time. There are some noteworthy trends to point out.
First, there is a signicant di¤erence in the level of political competition between Southern
7These elections range from US representatives, over the governorship, to down-ballot o¢ cers, such as
Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, and so on. We thank James Snyder for gener-
ously providing us with an updated version of the data.
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and non-Southern states. Second, this di¤erence increases between 1890 and 1940 due to
a reduction in political competition in Southern states. Third, beginning in 1940s, there
is an increase in political competition in the US South relative to the US non-South to
such a degree that, today, the US Southern states are more politically competitive than
non-Southern states.
The pattern observed in Figure 2 can be explained by historical events. By the 1880s,
the Democrats held a virtual monopoly over political o¢ ce in the US Southern states. They
achieved this by limiting the political participation of the black and low income population
which made up the supporter base of their main rivals - the Republicans. Several voting re-
strictions were introduced over the years including: the white primary, multiple ballot boxes,
poll taxes, literacy tests, and ultimately violence. This e¤ectively eliminated opposition to
the Democrats, and the fall in political competition is clearly visible in Figure 2.
Over time, a number of these practices were eliminated, and by the late 1950s, the remain-
ing two major obstacles to full political participation were the poll tax and the literacy test.
It was not until the 1960s that the dominance of the Democrats in US South was challenged
with the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, ratied in 1964, prohibiting
poll taxes in federal elections, and the introduction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act which did
two things: (1) it authorized the US attorney general to challenge the constitutionality of
the use of poll taxes in state and local actions; and (2) it provided for direct federal action in
"covered jurisdictions" to prohibit the use of the literacy test.8 Consequently, federal courts
quickly struck down the remaining poll taxes in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.9
The 1965 Voting Rights Act also targeted the states of Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, 40 counties in North Carolina, Apache County in Arizona, and Honolulu
County in Hawaii because of their literacy tests and low turnout. The resultant impact on
political competition in the US South was a reversal of the pre-war decline. As a robustness
8A covered jurisdiction was dened to be a state, county, parish, or town that used a test or device (e.g.,
a literacy test) and had less than a 50 percent turnout in the 1964 presidential election.
9Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina repealed theirs by 1945, followed by South Carolina
and Tennessee in 1951 and Arkansas in 1964.
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check for the analysis which follows, we use the introduction of the Voting Rights Act to
instrument for political competition. We will discuss this in more detail below.
The US banking sector is unique in the sense that there is an incredibly large number
of banks, most of which are relatively small. Bank failure is also more frequent relative
to other countries making the US an ideal setting to study bank failure. Data on bank
failures and the characteristics of the failing banks are sourced from the FDIC. Panel A
in Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample of failed banks. In total, there have
been 3995 bank failures in the US since 1934, not surprisingly, these have been concentrated
(2642 failures) in the two major crises since the great depression: the S&L crisis, 1986-1992
and the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 2007-2010 (see also Figure 3). If we compare
failures that occur in an election year, versus those that occur in a non-election year, we nd
that (for the full sample) 2229 of the 3995 failures occur in non-election years. Based on
these numbers, bank failure is about 1.25 times more likely in non-election years. Moreover,
if we focus only on failures that occur outside of crisis periods we see the non-election year
bias exacerbated - 768 of the 1353 failures occur in a non-election year implying bank failure
is about 1.3 times more likely in non-election years. Looking now at the state level bank
failure rate at in Panel B of Table 2, we see that for the full sample that average number of
bank failures per 100,000 population is 0.197 per year. If we decompose this into election
years versus non-election years we nd that the election year failure rate is 0.210 compared
to a non-election year failure rate of 0.185, which is counter to what our model predicts.
Further investigation shows that this higher failure rate in election years is driven by failures
occurring during crisis periods. We show that in non-crisis or "normal" periods, the failure
rate in election years is 0.014 which is only half the failure rate in non-election years. This
nding highlights the importance of properly controlling for impact of nancial crisis, we
discuss several approaches below.
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4 Empirical Strategy & Results
We conduct our empirical analysis at two levels. First, at the bank level, we study how
political competition and other bank/state characteristics a¤ect the timing of bank failures.
Our bank level logistic regressions take the form
(9) ELECTION FAILij = j + 0 + 1COMPETITIONj + 2SIZEi + 
0X+ "ij
Here, ELECTION FAILij is equal to one if bank i in state j fails in an election year,
j is a state xed-e¤ect, COMPETITIONj is our measure of political competition in state
j at the time of bank failure, SIZEi is either the log of total assets or one of four indicator
variables for each bank size quartile (Small, Small-Medium, Medium, and Large), X is a
vector of state and bank level control variables, and "ij is the error term. Our control
variables include the following: (a) DEMOCRAT GOV ERNOR is an indicator variable
equal to one if the governor at the time of bank failure was a Democrat; (b) DEMOCRAT
CONTROL is the fraction of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of Republican incum-
bents in all statewide races (excluding the president); (c) a measure of nancial risk, either
LEV ERAGE (Deposits=Assets) or SHORTFALL ([Deposits  Assets] =Deposits); (d)
ASSIST is a dummy variable that equals one if FDIC assistance results in survival; (e)
PAY OUT is a dummy variable that equals one if bank failure results in FDIC payout to
depositors; (f) ACQUIRED is a dummy variable that equals one if bank failure results
in acquisition by another bank; (g) NATIONAL is a dummy variable that equals one if
the bank is nationally chartered; (h) STATE CHARTER is a dummy variable that equals
one if the bank is state chartered; (i) THRIFT is a dummy variable that equals one if the
institution is a thrift; and (j) CRISIS is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank failed
in a crisis year.10
10Major crises include: S&L 1986-1992, GFC 2007-2010
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Second, at the state level, we study how the electoral cycle and political competition
impact on the likelihood of bank failure and the bank failure rate. Our state level regressions
take the form:
BANK FAILUREjt = j + 0 + 1ELECTIONjt + 2COMPETITIONjt
+3 [ELECTIONjt  COMPETITIONjt] +  0X+ ij(10)
Here, BANK FAILUREjt can be one of two variables, rst it is an indicator variable
equal to one if there is at least one bank failure in state j in year t, second it is a continuous
measure equal to the number of bank failures per 100,000 population. ELECTIONjt is
equal to one if there is an election in state j in year t. COMPETITIONjt is political
competition in state j in year t. X is a vector of state level control variables, and ij is the
error term. Our control variables include the following: (a) DEMOCRAT GOV ERNORjt
is an indicator variable equal to one if the governor is a Democrat in state j in year t; (b)
DEMOCRAT CONTROLjt is the fraction of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of
Republican incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the president) in state j in year t;
(c) GROWTHit is the annual growth in state income; and (d) INFLATIONit is the annual
ination rate.
Figure 3 demonstrates two things: rst, bank failure tends to be clustered around the
major crises, and second, crises tend to impact on states di¤erentially. Accordingly, in our
estimation of equation (10) we control for the di¤erential state clustering of bank failure in
crisis years in several ways - none of which are perfect solutions. First, is to "atten" the
distribution in Figure 3 and estimate a logit model whereBANK FAILUREjt is an indicator
variable that equals to one if there is any bank failure in state j in year t as well as including
the variable CRISIS (indicator equal to one in crisis years) into our specication. Next,
since we are in essence interested in estimating the impact of election cycles and political
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competition in "normal" times, a second approach is to simply exclude the crisis years
(1986-1992 and 2007-2010) from our estimation of (10) - using banks failures per 100,000
population as the dependent variable. The nal approach is to use our continuous measure
of state-level bank failure on our full sample but include CRISIS as well as [j  CRISIS]
into our specication.11
Tables 3 and 4 present our bank level results. The tables are identical except Table 3
uses a continuous measure for political competition whereas Table 4 uses dummy variables
for political competition quartiles (Competition 4Q is the highest competition quartile).
For each of the tables there are eight columns using varying combinations of control vari-
ables. Columns one through four use SHORTFALL as the measure of nancial risk while
columns ve through eight use LEV ERAGE. Even numbered columns use log assets as
the measure of SIZE and controls for whether the failure was an outright failure or as-
sisted transaction (ASSISTANCE). Odd numbered columns use four indicator variables
for bank size quartile (Small, Small-Medium, Medium, and Large) and also di¤erentiates
between the type of outright failure (PAY OUT or ACQUIRED). The results in Tables 3
and 4 are qualitatively identical, we focus the discussion on the results from Table 4 for ease
of interpretation.
Our bank level results provide consistent evidence in favour of Proposition 1b and Propo-
sition 2. More precisely, we show that - depending on the specication - small banks (banks
in the bottom size quartile) are between 1.7 ( 1= exp( 0:548)) to 2 ( 1= exp( 0:732))
times less likely to fail during an election year relative to the top size quartile. Using our
continuous size measure we show that an increase in the value of bank assets by 20 percent
increases the likelihood of a bank failing during an election year by between 4 to 5 percent.
Across all specications, the coe¢ cient estimate on the indicator variable for the top political
11All bank level data and failure characteristics are obtained from the FDIC website at www.fdic.gov.
State personal income and ination data are available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Information
for our variable DEMOCRAT GOV ERNOR was obtained from the National Governors Association at
www.nga.org. Election dates and data for DEMOCRAT CONTROL and COMPETITION come from
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) - a recent update of this data was kindly supplied by James Snyder in
electronic form. Unconditional sample means for these variables are contained in Table 2.
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competition quartile is negative and signicant - bank failure is 3.5 to 4 times less likely to
occur in an election year if the election is in the most competitive quartile.
The other result of interest is the relation between the type of bank failure and timing.
If the bank failure is recorded as an FDIC assisted transaction rather than outright failure
the bank is much more likely to have failed during an election year. The coe¢ cient esti-
mates on ASSISTANCE are positive and signicant across all specications and imply that
FDIC assisted transactions are 5 to 6 times more likely to occur in an election year rather
than outright failure. This makes intuitive sense as assisted transactions typically involve
restructuring which allows the institutions charter to survive. Accordingly, the economic
and political costs associated with assisted transactions are much lower than outright failure,
which may reduce political incentives to delay failure. When we distinguish between the
type of outright failure, we see more evidence that the larger the economic and political costs
associated with failure, the less likely the failure will occur in an election year. Outright
failures are those which lead to an institutions charter being terminated, they fall into two
broad categories: (a) the failing institution is acquired by another (ACQUIRED); and (b)
the FDIC pays depositors directly and places the bank assets in a liquidating receivership
(PAY OUT ). Of these two categories, failures that lead to FDIC payout are more severe and
costly. Looking at the coe¢ cient estimates, for both types of outright failure, the estimates
are negative and signicant implying that relative to assisted transactions, both forms of
outright failure are less likely to occur in an election year. The economic magnitudes of
the coe¢ cients suggest that more costly failures are more likely to be delayed: failure that
results in an FDIC payout is 9 to 11 times less likely to occur in an election year relative to
an assisted transaction whereas a failure resulting in the failing bank being acquired by an-
other institution is only 5 times less likely to occur in an election year relative to an assisted
transaction.
For our other control variables, we nd that relative to a nationally chartered bank,
thrifts are much less likely to fail in an election year. Since thrifts are typically a lot smaller
20
than nationally chartered banks, this result is most likely related to our prediction that the
private costs of delaying failure increase with bank size and therefore make it more likely
that the failure of small institutions are delayed. There is no di¤erence between state versus
nationally chartered banks. We also nd that in crisis years banks are more likely to fail in
an election year. This is not surprising since politicians can always associate the failure of a
local bank with the external crisis hence reducing the political cost of an election year local
bank failure. Finally, neither of our measures of nancial risk nor state political variables
appear to explain much variation in the timing of bank failure.
Before moving on to our state-level regressions, we attempt to assess the economic cost
of delaying failure. To the extent that failing banks take on more risks if they are allowed
to continue operating (i.e. gambling for resurrection), one might expect that delayed failure
leads to an accumulation of losses. We test this conjecture on a sub-sample of banks
(approximately two-thirds of the full sample) for which we have an FDIC estimate of the
loss incurred by the insurance fund as a result of the failure. Our dependent variable of
interest is LOSS RATEi which is dened as the estimated loss to the FDIC insurance fund
as a fraction of bank assets for bank i. We regress LOSS RATEi on an indicator variable
equal to one if bank i failed in an election year plus the same set of controls as in equation
(9). In the cross-section we expect that holding other things constant, banks failing in an
election year will have a lower loss rate. The results presented in Table 5 support this
conjecture. The coe¢ cient estimates show that banks failing in an election year have a loss
rate that is more than 0.05 (5% of assets) lower than banks failing in other years. With
an average loss rate of just under 0.25 (25% of assets), this estimate amounts to a loss rate
that is more than 20 percent lower for election year failures. Based on the average size
of failed banks, this translates to (approximately) an additional $3 million in losses to the
FDIC insurance fund for banks failing in non-election years.
At the state level, we use several strategies to assess the relation between the election
cycle and the state bank failure rate First, we use a logistic regression to determine whether
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the likelihood of observing a bank failure is lower in an election year while controlling for
state-level political and macroeconomic factors. The results are presented in Table 6, odd
numbered columns represent standard logit regressions. As robustness, we also use the
introduction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act to instrument for political competition since
this law change constituted an exogenous federal intervention into state politics unrelated
to bank failure. Specically, we instrument political competition with a variable which is
equal one after 1965 if a state was the target of federal intervention due to having either a
literacy test or a poll tax (or both) and zero otherwise. These results are presented in even
numbered columns.12 The results are consistent across all specications and estimation
techniques, save that our instrumental variables estimates are much larger in magnitude
than those obtained in the standard logit regressions. We therefore focus our discussion on
the more conservative estimates taken from the full model (column 5).
The coe¢ cient on our election year dummy indicates that bank failure is approximately
1.8 ( 1= exp( 0:607)) times less likely to occur in an election year. Of particular interest
is the coe¢ cient estimate for the interaction term - the impact of political competition in an
election year. In line with our prediction, the interaction between election year and political
competition is negative and signicant, suggesting the incentive to delay bank failure is
exacerbated if the election is close. We interpret this result in two ways to highlight its
importance. First, consider a state in which there is in increase in political competition of
0.03 (a 3 point swing) or a equivalently a reduction in the vote margin from, say, 55-45 to
52-48.13 This leads to an estimate for the magnitude of the overall impact of the election
cycle on the likelihood of bank failure increasing from 1.8 to approximately 2.2 - that is, bank
failure is 2.2 times less likely to occur in an election year if there has been a three point swing
since the last election. Second, consider the longer term implications of increasing political
competition. As discussed previously and documented in Figure 1, Southern states of the
12Similar approaches have been used by Besley et al. (2010) and Husted and Kenny (1997).
13This 0.03 increase actually represents an increase from the full sample median value of -0.05 to the 75th
percentile value of -0.02.
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US experienced signicant increases in political competition during the post war period, it
was common for these states to experience an increases in political competition of 0.3 (a
30 point swing). This magnitude of increase in competition leads to an estimate for the
overall e¤ect of the election cycle on bank failures changing from 1.8 to approximately 15
( 1= exp( 0:607+0:3 7:093)) - that is, as a result of the increase in political competition
witnessed in the Southern US states in the post-war period, bank failure in the US South is,
today, 15 times less likely to occur in an election year.
Interestingly, despite electoral incentives to delay failure, the coe¢ cient onCOMPETITION
is positive and signicant, implying that political competition, on average, actually increases
the likelihood of bank failure. Though, this positive impact is reduced signicantly in an
election year (more than halved) due to election year incentives to delay failure. This result
may not be as counterintuitive as it seems. There have been several recent studies showing
that political competition improves economic outcomes and is therefore welfare enhancing
(see for example, Polo, 1998; Svensson, 1998; and Besley et al., 2010). To the extent that
political competition enhances competition in the banking industry whereby bank failure is
an e¢ cient mechanism to ensure poor performing banks exit - thereby increasing the over-
all health of the local bank industry - one might expect that political competition to be
positively correlated with bank failure. The economic signicance of competition is large.
Based on estimates from column ve, an increase in political competition of 0.03 leads to
an increase in the likelihood of state-level bank failure by almost 40 percent. Our nd-
ing is in line with arguments made by Haber (2004, 2008) who demonstrates that political
competition lead to the breakdown of segmented banking monopolies and increased bank
competition in the US over the last century. As Haber (2004) eloquently put it:
"...the political institutions that limit the authority and discretion of gov-
ernment play a crucial role in the development of the banking system. These
political institutions vary across societies. There does not appear to be any single
algorithm for their optimal organization. Nevertheless, these institutions oper-
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ate according to a single unifying principle: they create institutionalized forms of
competition within the political system that allow the ambitions of individuals
or groups to be counteracted by the ambitions of other individuals or groups."14
The rest of our results are not surprising. Bank failure is more likely in crisis years and
with higher ination, and is less likely with higher economic growth. High ination is usually
accompanied with higher interest rates, which for the typical bank with a positive duration
gap leads to an erosion of net worth. Higher income growth typically leads to increased
demand for loans as well as a reduction in bad loans therefore improving net worth.
Second, we reestimate (10) using our continuous measure for BANK FAILUREjt (fail-
ures per 100,000 population). Due to the presence of a large number of observations with
the value of zero (over 55 percent of state-years have no bank failure) we estimate (10) using
a Tobit model since least squares estimates will lead to downward biased coe¢ cients. As
robustness we also reestimate (10) using a Tobit model where we use the introduction of the
1965 Voting Rights Act to instrument for COMPETITIONjt.15
Table 7 reports these results across two panels. Panel A excludes the major nancial
crises whereas Panel B uses the full sample. Panel B also includes additional controls: a
crisis dummy, as well as the crisis dummy interacted with state xed-e¤ects. While the
interpretation di¤ers, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 6 -
across both panels and all specications the coe¢ cient estimates are of the correct sign and
signicant. We therefore focus our discussion on main variables of interest using the results
from our full model (column 5).
The estimate on our election year dummy is -0.102 in Panel A and -0.0175 in Panel
14Harber (2004), "Political Institutions, Banks, and Economic Growth: Evidence from the United States
and Mexico." Standford University Working Paper. pg. 4.
15For comparison and completeness, we reproduce Table 7 using least squares and two-stage least squares.
These results are not reported to save space but we breiy describe them here. In Panel A (crisis years
ommitted), the coe¢ encient estimates are still signicant and of the correct sign however are smaller in
magnitude. In Panel B, the coe¢ cient estimate for COMPETITIONjt is still positive and signicant,
however, the relation between the election year dummy and its interaction with COMPETITIONjt are no
longer signicant. These results are not suprising given the downward bias introduced when using least
squares in the presence of a large fraction of zero observations.
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B. Recall from the summary statistics, the unconditional failure rate is 0.197 for the full
sample and 0.021 for the sub-sample excluding the crisis years. Compared to these mean
values, our coe¢ cient estimates suggest that, in an election year, there is a reduction in the
failure rate by 9 percent (  0:0175=0:197) when we include the crisis years and almost
500 percent (  0:102=0:021) when the crisis years are excluded (i.e. "normal times").
The coe¢ cient estimate on the interaction between competition and our election dummy
is -0.727 in Panel A and -0.325 in Panel B. With an increase in political competition of
0.03, our estimates therefore imply that the overall impact of the election year on bank
failure increases in magnitude by 0.022 ( 0:03  0:727) and 0.010 ( 0:03  0:325) for
Panels A and B respectively. This corresponds to a 20 percent ( 0:022=0:102) and 55
percent ( 0:010=0:0175) increase in magnitude for the impact of election years on bank
failure. Finally, the coe¢ cient estimates for competition is 0.808 in Panel A and 1.262
in Panel B. Consider again an increase in political competition of 0.03, an increase in
political competition of this magnitude increases the failure rate by 0.024 (about 100 percent
compared to the unconditional mean for non-crisis years of 0.021) and 0.038 (about 20 percent
compared to the unconditional mean for the full sample of 0.197).
5 Conclusion
We develop and test a simple game-theoretic model to study political incentives to delay
bank failure. Our model predicts that politicians have an incentive to delay bank failure in
election years and that this incentive is exacerbated if the election is close. Moreover, our
model predicts that the failure of small banks is more likely to be delayed than that of large
banks.
Our empirical application tests these predictions using US data at the bank level and
at the state level. At the bank level, we show that small banks (smallest size quartile)
are up to 2 times less likely to fail in an election year than large banks. We also show
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that bank failure is up to 4 times less likely to occur in years where state elections were in
highest competition quartile. At the state level, we show that we are 1.8 times less likely
to observe any bank failure in an election year. If we consider a three point swing in the
competitiveness of the election, or equivalently a reduction in the vote margin from, say,
55-45 to 52-48 this election year e¤ect increases in magnitude to 2.2. Our analysis using
a continuous measure of state bank failure (failures per 100,000 population) supports these
ndings, and is robust to di¤erent specications and estimation techniques.
Our results demonstrate that even developed democracies such as the US are not immune
from the incentive problems faced by politicians. The implications for policy is that bank
regulatory and closure rules need to account for the perverse incentives of politicians. Similar
to central bank independence, the results here suggest that bank regulators may also require
the same type of independence to e¤ectively carry out their role.
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Table 1: Payo¤ matrix
Political Candidate Political Candidate
Delay
Do
Nothing
Delay
Do
Nothing
More Risky
Loans (k = k)
ub(k)  0
ui(n) > 0
ub(k) < 0
ui(n) < 0
More Risky
Loans (k = k)
ub(k)  0
ui(n) < 0
ub(k) < 0
ui(n) = 0
B
an
ke
r
Recapitalize
(k = k)
ub(k) = 0
ui(n) < 0
ub(k) = 0
ui(n) = 0
B
an
ke
r
Recapitalize
(k = k)
ub(k) = 0
ui(n) < 0
ub(k) = 0
ui(n) = 0
(a) If there is an election on date T (b) If there is no election on date T
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis. With the exception
of Failures, Failures in election year and Failures in non-election year, all reported values are the averages.
Failures, Failures in election year and Failures in non-election year are the total number of bank failures,
respectively, for the full sample, in election years and non-election years from 1934 to 2012. Loss rate is the
FDIC estimated loss given failure scaled by total assets. Shortfall is (Deposits-Assets)/Deposits. Leverage
is Deposits/Assets. Size is the natural log of the banks assets. Assist is a dummy variable that equals 1
if FDIC assistance results in survival. Payout is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank failure results in
FDIC payout to depositors. Acquired is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank failure results in acquisition
by another bank. National is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is nationally chartered. State charter
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is state chartered. Thrift is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank
is a thrift. Failure rate is the within-state number of bank failures per 100,000 population. Competition is
the within-state political competition measure from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002). Governor is Democrat
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the states governor is a Democrat. Democrat Control is the fraction
of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of Republican incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the
president). Growth is the annual growth in state income. Ination is the annual ination rate. The "Non-
Crisis" sample excludes the major crises: 1986-1992 (S&L) and 2007-2010 (GFC).
PANEL A: Bank Level Data 1934-2012
Total Crisis Non-Crisis Mid West North East South West
Failures 3995 2642 1353 962 425 1979 629
Failures in election year 1766 1181 585 440 194 890 242
Failures in non-election year 2229 1461 768 522 231 1089 387
Loss rate 0.247 0.251 0.163 0.191 0.184 0.278 0.239
Shortfall -36.164 -52.038 -0.187 -0.267 -204.827 -0.072 -106.334
Leverage 0.945 0.974 0.880 0.913 0.899 0.975 0.924
Size 10.816 11.395 9.506 9.955 11.718 10.897 11.301
Assist 0.149 0.132 0.183 0.163 0.144 0.154 0.116
Payout 0.144 0.076 0.278 0.209 0.096 0.123 0.146
Acquired 0.705 0.790 0.540 0.628 0.760 0.721 0.738
National 0.204 0.223 0.167 0.102 0.184 0.264 0.184
State charter 0.429 0.337 0.608 0.565 0.320 0.385 0.432
Thrift 0.367 0.440 0.225 0.333 0.496 0.351 0.383
PANEL B: State Level Data 1934-2010
Total Crisis Non-Crisis Mid West North East South West
Failure rate 0.197 0.455 0.021 0.090 0.054 0.371 0.071
Failure rate in election year 0.210 0.524 0.014 0.041 0.010 0.194 0.030
Failure rate in non-election year 0.185 0.400 0.028 0.049 0.044 0.176 0.042
Competition -0.073 -0.050 -0.088 -0.061 -0.063 -0.090 -0.063
Governor is Democrat 0.486 0.397 0.546 0.403 0.501 0.537 0.464
Democrat Control 0.120 0.185 0.079 -0.147 0.071 0.352 -0.002
Growth 0.063 0.038 0.082 0.059 0.060 0.063 0.069
Ination 0.033 0.030 0.034 0.030 0.032 0.035 0.031
31
Table 3: Panel logit regression of individual bank failure.
This table reports logit regression results on individual bank failure. The sample period is from 1934
to 2012. The dependent variable is a indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank fails in the election
year and 0 otherwise. Competition is the within-state political competition measure from Ansolabehere
and Snyder (2002). Governor is Democrat is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the states governor is
a Democrat. Democrat Control is the fraction of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of Republican
incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the president). Shortfall is (Deposits-Assets)/Deposits. Leverage
is Deposits/Assets. Size is the natural log of the banks assets. Small, Small-Med and Medium are bank
size dummy if the bank is in in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd size (total assets) quartile. Assist is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if FDIC assistance results in "survival". Payout is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank
failure results in FDIC payout to depositors. Acquired is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank failure
results in acquisition by another bank. State charter is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is state
chartered. Thrift is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is a thrift. Crisis is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if sample year lies in the major banking crisis period, i.e. from 1986 to 1992 (S&L) and from 2007
to 2010 (GFC). All regressions contain state xed e¤ects. z-statistics based on robust cluster standard errors
(clustered by state) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signicance levels of 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Competition -6.285** -6.718*** -4.727* -5.619** -6.327** -6.745*** -4.683* -4.683*
(-2.533) (-2.663) (-1.922) (-2.238) (-2.475) (-2.601) (-1.879) (-1.879)
Governor is Democrat 0.143 0.152 0.122 0.141 0.144 0.152 0.115 0.115
(0.777) (0.817) (0.624) (0.733) (0.775) (0.811) (0.585) (0.585)
Democrat control -0.356 -0.351 -0.390 -0.372* -0.355 -0.351 -0.390 -0.390
(-1.561) (-1.579) (-1.638) (-1.673) (-1.558) (-1.577) (-1.642) (-1.642)
Shortfall 0.0148 0.0106 -0.00881 -0.0118
(1.629) (1.146) (-0.936) (-1.177)
Leverage 0.109 0.0652 -0.137 -0.137
(0.574) (0.369) (-0.846) (-0.846)
Size 0.283*** 0.244*** 0.286*** 0.246***
(7.221) (7.364) (6.643) (6.568)
Small -0.732*** -0.580*** -0.721*** -0.721***
(-4.262) (-3.827) (-3.915) (-3.915)
Small-Med -0.122 -0.0908 -0.106 -0.106
(-1.236) (-0.949) (-1.033) (-1.033)
Medium -0.118 -0.0810 -0.107 -0.107
(-0.741) (-0.492) (-0.654) (-0.654)
Assist 1.782*** 1.840*** 1.778*** 1.841***
(8.976) (10.09) (8.805) (10.03)
Payout -2.240*** -2.497*** -2.239***
(-13.88) (-15.23) (-13.65)
Acquired -1.640*** -1.648*** -1.637***
(-8.177) (-8.727) (-8.081)
State charter 0.0887 0.0979 0.0107 0.0430 0.0942 0.102 0.0133 0.0133
(0.929) (1.058) (0.116) (0.478) (0.985) (1.096) (0.145) (0.145)
Thrift -1.028*** -0.936*** -0.819*** -0.737*** -1.028*** -0.935*** -0.810*** -0.810***
(-9.017) (-8.095) (-7.089) (-6.540) (-8.913) (-7.933) (-7.053) (-7.053)
Crisis 1.278*** 1.203*** 1.391*** 1.257*** 1.268*** 1.197*** 1.397*** 1.397***
(9.132) (8.373) (9.246) (8.533) (9.275) (8.481) (9.440) (9.440)
Constant -4.220*** -2.028*** -0.994*** 0.793** -4.352*** -2.109** -0.873** -0.873**
(-6.554) (-2.943) (-2.735) (1.960) (-5.151) (-2.357) (-1.962) (-1.962)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,274 3,274 3,274 3,274
Pseudo R2 0.154 0.156 0.138 0.145 0.154 0.156 0.138 0.138
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Table 4: Panel logit regression of individual bank failure.
This table reports logit regression results on individual bank failure. The sample period is from 1934 to
2012. The dependent variable is a indicator variable that equals 1 if the bank fails in the election year
and 0 otherwise. The within-state political competition measure (Competition) is divided into quartiles.
Dummy variables are created to indicate the competition quartile for each state-year. Governor is Democrat
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the states governor is a Democrat. Democrat Control is the fraction
of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of Republican incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the
president). Shortfall is (Deposits-Assets)/Deposits. Leverage is Deposits/Assets. Size is the natural log of
the banks assets. Small, Small-Med and Medium are bank size dummy if the bank is in in the 1st, 2nd
and 3rd size (total assets) quartile. Assist is a dummy variable that equals 1 if FDIC assistance results in
"survival". Payout is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank failure results in FDIC payout to depositors.
Acquired is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank failure results in acquisition by another bank. State
charter is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is state chartered. Thrift is a dummy variable that equals
1 if bank is a thrift. Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if sample year lies in the major banking
crisis period, i.e. from 1986 to 1992 (S&L) and from 2007 to 2010 (GFC). All regressions contain state xed
e¤ects. z-statistics based on robust cluster standard errors (clustered by state) are reported in parentheses.
*, ** and *** represent signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Competition 2Q -0.371 -0.382 -0.306 -0.339 -0.367 -0.378 -0.300 -0.300
(-1.040) (-1.050) (-0.885) (-0.953) (-1.032) (-1.042) (-0.868) (-0.868)
Competition 3Q -0.371 -0.365 -0.302 -0.314 -0.367 -0.359 -0.290 -0.290
(-0.906) (-0.879) (-0.748) (-0.762) (-0.886) (-0.855) (-0.710) (-0.710)
Competition 4Q -1.413*** -1.456*** -1.327*** -1.409*** -1.407*** -1.451*** -1.317*** -1.317***
(-3.475) (-3.502) (-3.312) (-3.419) (-3.461) (-3.488) (-3.288) (-3.288)
Governor is Democrat 0.410 0.438 0.361 0.413 0.407 0.434 0.353 0.353
(1.450) (1.553) (1.237) (1.436) (1.446) (1.546) (1.209) (1.209)
Democrat control -0.387 -0.380 -0.436* -0.411* -0.387 -0.380 -0.436* -0.436*
(-1.597) (-1.612) (-1.701) (-1.719) (-1.594) (-1.612) (-1.704) (-1.704)
Shortfall 0.00980 0.00465 -0.0123 -0.0197
(0.996) (0.469) (-0.994) (-1.025)
Leverage -0.00177 -0.0546 -0.205 -0.205
(-0.0109) (-0.339) (-1.266) (-1.266)
Size 0.252*** 0.211*** 0.252*** 0.210***
(8.045) (7.898) (7.530) (7.075)
Small -0.708*** -0.548*** -0.690*** -0.690***
(-4.776) (-4.028) (-4.354) (-4.354)
Small-Med -0.143 -0.110 -0.118 -0.118
(-1.403) (-1.126) (-1.111) (-1.111)
Medium -0.130 -0.0942 -0.114 -0.114
(-0.844) (-0.591) (-0.720) (-0.720)
Assistance 1.758*** 1.818*** 1.756*** 1.821***
(7.474) (8.197) (7.368) (8.159)
Payout -2.202*** -2.441*** -2.210***
(-10.04) (-11.38) (-9.896)
Acquired -1.626*** -1.636*** -1.625***
(-7.068) (-7.510) (-6.998)
State charter 0.108 0.121 0.0298 0.0699 0.113 0.124 0.0327 0.0327
(1.074) (1.243) (0.301) (0.735) (1.127) (1.280) (0.331) (0.331)
Thrift -1.003*** -0.911*** -0.840*** -0.755*** -0.997*** -0.903*** -0.827*** -0.827***
(-8.575) (-8.051) (-6.999) (-6.825) (-8.447) (-7.840) (-6.961) (-6.961)
Crisis 1.231*** 1.150*** 1.360*** 1.214*** 1.229*** 1.151*** 1.371*** 1.371***
(8.140) (7.434) (8.754) (7.796) (8.129) (7.490) (8.887) (8.887)
Constant -3.421*** -1.208*** -0.656 1.177*** -3.425*** -1.142** -0.486 -0.486
(-7.221) (-2.871) (-1.585) (3.469) (-6.185) (-2.056) (-1.124) (-1.124)
Observations 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,273 3,274 3,274 3,274 3,274
Pseudo R2 0.164 0.167 0.152 0.159 0.164 0.167 0.152 0.152
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Table 5: The Economic Cost of Delay.
This table reports panel regression on loss rate of failed banks (with xed e¤ects). The sample period is from
1934 to 2012. The dependent variable, Loss rate, is the FDIC estimated loss given failure scaled by total
assets. Failure occurred in election year is a dummy variable if the bank fails in election year. Competition is
the within-state political competition measure from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002). Governor is Democrat
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the states governor is a Democrat. Democrat Control is the fraction
of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of Republican incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the
president). Size is the natural log of the banks assets. Small, Small-Med and Medium are bank size dummy
if the bank is in in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd size (total assets) quartile. Assist is a dummy variable that equals 1
if FDIC assistance results in "survival". Payout is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank failure results in
FDIC payout to depositors. Acquired is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank failure results in acquisition
by another bank. State charter is a dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is state chartered. Thrift is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if bank is a thrift. Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if sample year
lies in the major banking crisis period, i.e. from 1986 to 1992 (S&L) and from 2007 to 2010 (GFC).
All regressions contain state xed e¤ects. z-statistics based on robust cluster standard errors (clustered by
state) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signicance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Failure occurred in election year -0.0555** -0.0563** -0.0566** -0.0572**
(-2.272) (-2.334) (-2.330) (-2.394)
Competition -0.0266 -0.00995 -0.0131 0.00685
(-0.0651) (-0.0247) (-0.0334) (0.0177)
Governor is Democrat -0.0601 -0.0618 -0.0623 -0.0642
(-1.278) (-1.304) (-1.410) (-1.445)
Democrat control -0.0190 -0.0167 -0.0177 -0.0153
(-0.585) (-0.507) (-0.555) (-0.473)
Size -0.0257*** -0.0223***
(-4.931) (-4.655)
Small 0.0833*** 0.0705***
(4.456) (4.273)
Small-Med 0.0917*** 0.0839***
(4.699) (4.731)
Medium 0.0323*** 0.0251**
(2.655) (2.047)
Assistance -0.157*** -0.153***
(-10.96) (-10.95)
Payout 0.272*** 0.274***
(9.083) (9.447)
Acquired 0.150*** 0.145***
(10.37) (10.40)
State charter 0.0262** 0.0277** 0.0253*** 0.0265***
(2.489) (2.484) (2.614) (2.605)
Thrift 0.173** 0.170** 0.155** 0.153**
(2.005) (1.961) (2.029) (2.003)
Crisis -0.499*** -0.476*** -0.472*** -0.452***
(-7.937) (-8.036) (-8.302) (-8.499)
Constant 1.034*** 0.696*** 0.796*** 0.506***
(7.857) (9.489) (7.013) (8.347)
Observations 2,074 2,074 2,074 2,074
Number of state 48 48 48 48
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Table 6: Panel logit regressions on bank failure at the state-level
This table reports panel logit regression on bank failure rate at the state-level. The sample period is from
1934 to 2012. The dependent variable is a dummy variable if state j has at least 1 bank failure in year t.
Election year is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a state election is held in that year. Competition is the
within-state political competition measure from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002). Governor is Democrat
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the states governor is a Democrat. Democrat Control is the fraction
of Democrat incumbents less the fraction of Republican incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the
president). Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is in a major banking crisis period, i.e. from
1986 to 1992 (S&L) and from 2007 to 2010 (GFC). Growth is the annual growth in state income. Ination is
the annual ination rate. All regressions contain individual (state) xed e¤ects. z-statistics based on robust
cluster standard errors (clustered by state) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signicance
levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit-IV Logit Logit-IV Logit Logit-IV
Election year -0.452*** -5.092*** -0.463*** -5.059*** -0.607*** -4.453***
(-3.953) (-24.27) (-4.068) (-20.86) (-5.216) (-16.98)
Competition 12.96*** 13.00*** 11.08***
(5.322) (5.359) (4.228)
\Competition 120.4*** 119.9*** 113.3***
(32.97) (29.33) (22.79)
Election year  Competition -6.557*** -79.92*** -6.667*** -79.49*** -7.093*** -74.92***
(-4.903) (-25.10) (-4.909) (-21.50) (-4.606) (-17.68)
Governor is Democrat -0.226 0.276 -0.169 0.445
(-0.706) (0.832) (-0.513) (1.312)
Democrat control 0.339 0.0588 0.132 0.298
(1.120) (0.195) (0.424) (0.974)
Crisis 3.154*** 1.829*** 3.190*** 1.893*** 3.688*** 2.592***
(29.27) (17.89) (29.14) (17.90) (29.65) (23.46)
Growth -2.986*** -0.0190
(-3.457) (-0.0216)
Ination 26.76*** 19.23***
(15.42) (10.97)
Constant -1.595*** -12.89*** -14.53*** -12.48*** -18.47*** -14.90***
(-9.419) (-12.52) (-13.77) (-11.72) (-17.11) (-13.64)
Observations 7,144 7,042 6,911 6,911 6,443 6,443
Pseudo R2 0.508 0.524 0.515 0.532 0.561 0.571
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Table 7: State level panel tobit regressions on bank failure rate
This table reports panel tobit regression on bank failure rate at the state-level. The dependent variable is
the number of failed banks per 100,000 population in state j in year t. Election year is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if a state election is held in that year. Competition is the within-state political competition
measure from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002). Governor is Democrat is a dummy variable that equals
1 if the states governor is a Democrat. Democrat Control is the fraction of Democrat incumbents less
the fraction of Republican incumbents in all statewide races (excluding the president). Crisis is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the year is in a major banking crisis period, i.e. from 1986 to 1992 (S&L) and from
2007 to 2010 (GFC). Growth is the annual growth in state income. Ination is the annual ination rate.
All regressions contain individual (state) xed e¤ects. z-statistics based on robust cluster standard errors
(clustered by state) are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent signicance levels of 10%, 5% and
1%, respectively.
PANEL A: Major banking crisis periods (1986-1992, 2007-2010) are excluded from the sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tobit Tobit-IV Tobit Tobit-IV Tobit Tobit-IV
Election year -0.0998*** -0.577*** -0.101*** -0.580*** -0.102*** -0.558***
(-2.999) (-207.3) (-28.36) (-188.8) (-35.42) (-220.6)
Competition 0.979*** 1.002*** 0.808***
(3.423) (35.97) (34.44)
\Competition 9.753*** 9.897*** 10.70***
(383.9) (288.2) (362.6)
Election year  Competition -0.667*** -6.769*** -0.679*** -6.841*** -0.727*** -7.237***
(-3.749) (-352.5) (-25.35) (-350.1) (-28.92) (-351.6)
Governor is Democrat 0.0178*** 0.0378*** 0.0197*** 0.0590***
(5.586) (15.01) (6.850) (23.95)
Democrat control -0.0234*** -0.0590*** -0.0346*** -0.0321***
(-9.682) (-28.97) (-14.92) (-16.59)
Growth -0.999*** -0.499***
(-45.77) (-26.80)
Ination 2.250*** 2.366***
(112.8) (122.1)
Constant -0.342*** -0.776*** -1.401*** -0.781*** -1.412*** -0.847***
(-3.664) (-309.9) (-338.7) (-234.6) (-438.5) (-315.1)
Sigma 0.248*** 0.241*** 0.248*** 0.241*** 0.237*** 0.232***
(5.233) (512.2) (217.0) (337.9) (285.3) (415.8)
Observations 4,399 4,326 4,260 4,260 3,839 3,839
Pseudo R2 0.271 0.318 0.273 0.320 0.333 0.374
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PANEL B: Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tobit Tobit-IV Tobit Tobit-IV Tobit Tobit-IV
Election year -0.0285*** -0.662*** -0.0236*** -0.644*** -0.0175*** -0.439***
(-15.82) (-286.4) (-10.28) (-310.5) (-10.13) (-232.3)
Competition 1.826*** 1.695*** 1.262***
(53.80) (63.24) (57.51)
\Competition 17.12*** 16.82*** 13.09***
(348.7) (521.7) (463.6)
Election year  Competition -0.538*** -10.43*** -0.489*** -10.23*** -0.325*** -7.648***
(-18.97) (-334.4) (-16.69) (-508.0) (-12.44) (-362.2)
Governor is Democrat -0.168*** -0.131*** -0.165*** -0.117***
(-82.05) (-65.40) (-74.19) (-52.99)
Democrat control 0.0785*** 0.0297*** 0.0554*** 0.0745***
(17.02) (6.783) (14.55) (20.51)
Growth -0.585*** -0.237***
(-33.31) (-14.66)
Ination 4.168*** 3.502***
(212.6) (178.0)
Crisis 0.939*** 0.786*** 0.996*** 0.823*** 1.036*** 0.902***
(571.2) (497.0) (430.6) (363.3) (592.8) (513.5)
Constant -0.462*** -0.844*** -1.899*** -0.837*** -1.970*** -1.201***
(-158.7) (-285.1) (-804.0) (-438.2) (-1,053) (-725.5)
Sigma 0.341*** 0.339*** 0.333*** 0.332*** 0.323*** 0.322***
(778.0) (1,617) (336.0) (518.5) (498.6) (756.9)
Observations 7,144 7,049 6,916 6,916 6,448 6,448
Pseudo R2 0.628 0.640 0.644 0.653 0.676 0.682
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Figure 1: Lemma 1
(a) When a exceeds both W
P+W
and W
P 0+W and P
0 > P .
(b) When a is less than both W
P+W
and W
P 0+W , and a
0 < a.
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Figure 2: Political Competition by Decades
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Figure 3: Bank Failures
(a) Bank failures over time
(a) Bank failures over time by region
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